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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Josiah Royce undertakes the interpretation of the 
primary philosophical theories because of his firm convic-
tion that a thorough knowledge and understanding of the trends 
in the history of thought is essential as the basis for any 
undertaking in the realm of philosophy. 
Our common dependence upon the history of 
thought for all our reflective undertakings is 
unquestionable. Our best originality, if we 
ever get any oririnality, must spring from this 
very dependence. 
Royce surely followed his convictions, for he is, 
first of all, a thorough scholar in his field. 11His pro-
cedure was first to gather and digest whatever the sciences 
or the devil might have to say. n 2 His interpretations are 
marked with an excellent employment of the principle of 
selection, for he chooses only those parts of historical 
systems the interpretation of which seem essential to him. 
This paper will proceed, first, with an account of 
Royce's interpretation of four prominent thinkers in the 
history of philosophy, namely, Spinoza, Berkeley, Kant, and 
1 Royce, SUP, vii. (A list of the standard abbreviations 
to be used in this thesis may be found in the bibliography.) 
2 Santayana, COUS, 99. 
' 
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Hegel. No attempt will be made in this thesis to consider 
all the contributions made by Spinoza, Berkeley, Kant, and 
Hegel to philosophy; the concern is only with Josiah Royce's 
interpretation of these four philosophers. This account 
of Royce's interpretations will comprise four chapters. The 
concluding chapter will contain a criticism of Royce's inter-
pretation by the employment of Royce's own philosophical the-
ories as points of reference, and a summary of the thesis. 
I 
i· 
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CHAPTER II 
JOSIAH ROYCE'S INTERPRETATION OF SPINOZAl 
Royce's treatment of Spinoza may be divided into 
two parts; first, the religious aspect of Spinoza, and 
second, a study of the Tractatus Theologico~Politicus with 
reference to Spinoza•s life and time. 
As the best representative of the Absolutism and 
Naturalism of the seventeenth century, Royce chooses Spin-
oza, because of the extreme nature of Spinoza• s position 
and its illustration of the trend of the time. Three main 
ideas were current in the philosophy of the century, accor-
ding to Royce: first, that nature is a mechanism; second, 
that human reason is capable of grasping the truth of na-
ture; and third, that philosophy must imitate the principle 
of mathematics for precision.2 Because this era appears to 
be coldly scientific, one might suppose any profound reli-
gious passion to be lacking. To prove the error of this 
supposition, Royce examines the religious aspect of Spino%a, 
and never ceases to marvel at the paradox in Spinoza's na-
ture, exemplified by the strange combination of his cold 
1 Royce's chief discussions of Spinoza may be found in the 
following books: Royce, SMP, 32-67; Royce, FE, 290-299. 
This chapter is based on the material cited. 
2 Royce, SV!P, 41. 
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love of mathematics and his adoration of the Eternal. 
According to Royce, all deep religious beliefs come 
from two sources. The first source, which Royce describes 
almost ironically, is the desire to find an authoritative,· 
moral God. It originates in a wish to fight on the Lord's 
side, to find something to serve and for which to work vig-
orously. The religion which is the outcome of these desires 
is the Religion of Duty. The second source, and this seems 
to be more to Royce's taste, originates in the groping of a 
disappointed individual for some great objective truth that is 
perfect and that embodies all the strength which is lacking 
to this seeker of truth, that is victorious where he fails. 
It is that for which a man looks who has been baffled by the 
transient nature of the finite, or disillusioned by worldly 
failures. The outcome of these desires for a perfect truth 
is the religion of the mystic. 
It is to this second, mystical belief, that Spinoza 
attaches himself, and a brief glimpse at his life will ex-
plain this position, according to Royce. Spinoza was an 
outcast. His own race denounced him as a heretic, and, 
despite the fact that he was called to Heidelberg, Europe 
ignored him to a large extent because he was a Jew. Con-
sequently, he was a recluse, and lived a life of lonely 
contemplation. Despite his isolation, Spinoza was able to 
l 
:i 
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formulate a happy spiritual outlook, and Royce considers 
this admirable. As a matter of fact, Royce observes, the 
only serious limitation caused by Spinoza's loneliness was 
his inability to cope with the deeper social problems. The 
religion of the mystic is not an inspiration to those who 
desire to serve or to fight !or a cause; rather it is a com-
tort to the disillusioned and downcast. Thus Spinoza, the 
outcast, forgets his own disappointments in a mystical adora-
tion of a perfect order. 
The mystic always tells the story of the emptiness 
of the sensory life and of the finite world, says Royce: 
His polemic is against the sharp out-
lines of the world of Independent Beings, 
against the fallacies of all finite ideas, 
and agains1 the possibility of worldly sat-
isfaction. 
Spinoza repeats the tale of all mystics, and yet 
remains a true philosopher. Anyone who has experienced 
disillusionment may share Spinoza's mystical passion to 
worship something great and perfect, Royce goes on to say, 
but to be a true philosopher, one must justify this passion. 
To justify a mystical belief in the cold, clear-thinking 
seventeenth century would seem to present a difficult task, 
l Royce, vrr, I, 176. 
---6---
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yet Royce believes that Spinoza has succeeded in doing what 
might well be considered the impossible. 
Spinoza bases his mystica belief on the axiom that 
whatever cannot be explained by its own nature must be explained 
by sone higher nature which forces it to be what it is. To ill-
ustrate this axiom, Royce suggests that, since two mountains 
are precisely the same height for no obvious reason, there 
must be some higher force that causes them to be what they 
are. Cause and explanation mean the same thing to Spinoza. 
Proceeding from this axiom, the~, Spinoza holds that there 
must be some highest nature of things. This highest nature 
he calls Substance, and this is confusing, Royce believes, 
since Spinoza's meaning of Substance is foreign to that of 
any other thinker. This Substance of Spinoza's is infinite 
and self-evident, it is self-determined and eternal, and we 
individuals and all of our doings are merely the result of 
it. All happenings in the world follow from it. This eter-
nal Substance is Spinoza•s God. In the infinity of this God 
Spinoza's finiteness is submerged, and he loses sight of his 
worldly disappointments in contemplation of the perfection 
of his God. 
But, Royce suggests, we may inquire of this Substance, 
is it dead, is it a blind thing! According to Royce, Spinoza's 
answer is original; Substance is like a holy scripture, the 
,, 
,, 
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teachings of which have been translated into many languages, 
and which are complete in each different language. Royce 
tells of the two knowable aspects which Spinoza attributes 
to these self-expressions: the material world, or bodily 
substance, and the world of thought, or thinking substance. 
These two aspects are equally real, equally independent, and 
completely parallel. As tar as the body extends, so does the 
mind, and as far as the mind extends, so does the body, and 
no further. God's thought produces our thinking and we are 
a part of the whole. 1 
The optimism of the mystic belief lies in the fact 
that theeternal possesses an infinitely perfect mind of which 
our minds are only small parts. Spinoza's idea of the wise 
man is a picture of an individual making his way through the 
maze of finite disillusionments as if hypnotized, adoring 
the perfection of the Eternal. 
It is interesting to note that, for all his sympa-
thy with Spinoza's concept, Royce discards the mystical the-
ory in his examination of the historical concepts of being, 
because it renders the eternal inaccessible and does not 
even.endenvor to escape subjectivity.2 
l Royce, SMP, 58-65. 
2 Royce, va, I, 186-195. 
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In dealing with the Tractatus Theolo&ico-Politicus 
with reference to Spinoza's life and time, Royce examines 
briefly the attempts made in the seventeenth century to for-
mulate ethical theories. The chief characteristics of these 
theories are that they were made on the basis of reason, and 
that in them there was no reference to theology. The natur-
alistic trend of the time is to be seen in the natural laws 
that are mentioned in the ethics. By studying man and all 
of his desires, rights and duties, it was supposed, laws 
could be determined with mathematical precision. Royce 
points out that although these natural laws are out of favor 
now because of their subjectivity, they are a definite contri-
bution to philosophy in that they violate the moralistic, the-
ological tradition. 
To clarify his interpretation of Spinoza•s natural 
rights, Royce compares Spinoza's ethical and political the-
ories with those of Hoobes. 
Hobbes bases his theories on the belief that man is 
innately and fundamentally selrish by nature. Because of this 
selfishness, the state of nature is one of constant warfare 
and conflict. The only way to cope with this natural war-
fare, according to Hobbes, is to set up a government which l. :i 
is similar in nature to a social contract in that, adopting 
-ZSiZIE?E 
---9---
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this method, men sacrifice a certain portion of their indi-
vidual freedom for the purpose of eliminating conflict. 
This form of government, Hobbes holds according to Royce, 
would be more successful in granting each individual the 
natural rights to which he is entitled, and at the same 
time in eliminating struggle in society for selfish ends, if 
it were controlled by one sovereign. This one sovereign would 
make laws to avoid war and create a harmonious unity within 
the state. Hobbes holds that the very selfishness of man 
will offset any revolutionary movements that might be made 
under this form of social absolutism, for if an attempt were 
actually mande to overthrow the government, failure to sue-
ceed in the undertaking would mean punishment for those con-
earned, and success would mean a return to the old chaotic 
state of warfare. 
Royce criticizes Hobbes because the very core of 
his political system is one-sided and pessimistic. How 
awful, Royce feels, to base any theory on the assumption 
that man's nature is so selfish a thing, and how gloomy 
to go on to say that the social contract, which is Hobbes' 
solution of the matter, will succeed primarily because of 
this selfishness. 
Spinoza, like Hobbes, believes man to be a selfish 
being. But, while Hobbes solves his problem by social 
.---llilWI"'E!!!Z7' FENS' rrrnna=' 7 nv r r w-m r srr:·ret~rm r:r=•msne rnmmtewreew t , M»»'t'tMit*'tf''lb'tifs··w" ttltMW 
:l 
[I 
. I 
---10--~ 
-~-- ------==.......:::-_____ - -- =--==== 
absolutism---the single soven!~n in power---Spinoza more 
happily holds that, just as selfishness is present in man's 
nature, so is the impulse to sacrifice a certain amount of 
individual freedom. Royce tells us that Spinoza's theory 
is that, while selfishness will create in each individual 
a desire for self-preservation, the inevitable end will be---
caused by the impulse to sacrifice---the desire of each 
person to see the preservation of his neighbor also. Con-
sequently, Spinoza's state is founded on laws of justice 
and freedom. Contrary to Hobbes, Spinoza favors the repub-
al 
lican form of government, buththough both agree that revo-
lutions are hazardous, Spinoza's reason for so belie7fing 
is more optimistic, according to Royce. Spinoza holds that 
government is a public habit and that habits are hard to 
change, wh:i le Hobbes is convinced that revolution would 
result in punishment or chaos. 
Royce almost congratulates Spinoza for making eel-
fishnese hie starting point only: 
With Hobbes the State is the last des-
perate resort of war-weary savages; with 
Spinoza it is the expression of the higher 
consciousness of mankind. 
Although many critics doubt whether Spinoza ever 
read Hobbes before writing his Tractatue, Royce thinks the 
l Royce, FE, 297 • 
---11---
influence of Hobbes is so clearly marked in the similarities 
discussed, that Spinoza must have had some knowledge'or 
Hobbes' theories. 
According to Royce, the Tractatus ~heolo~ico-Politi-
~contains principles of toleration and of liberty, and 
views on religious strife that are far in advance of the 
time. The first pnrt of the Tractate deals with the rela-
tionship of religion and morality. Because he had been cast 
out of his own church, Spinoza was able to look at this prob-
lem more objectively in his remoteness. His very loneliness 
gave him a point of view that is more wise and certainly more 
advanced than that of any other man of his time. He saw that 
the fundamental virtues and duties were emphasized alike by 
all churches, but that in relation to one another, the various 
denominations completely forgot these principles. Royce 
thinks that one of the most bitter observations Spinoza made 
was that the small sects were in constant strife over small, 
trivial matters in which they differed ·to sone slight degree. 
Spinoza uses, for example, the !act that each denomination 
interpreted the Scrtptures in any way which was most pleasing 
and useful to them, and fought for these interpretations. 
This smallness destroyed any opportunity for moral helpfulness 
that the churches might have had. 
-----
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The second part of the Tractate has to do with the 
attitude of the State toward the religious sects, and here 
also, Royce thinks Hobbes influenced Spinoza. Having proven 
the helplessness of the churches by his exposition of the 
trite quarrels of the various denominations, Spinoza concludes 
that there is danger lurking in the misplaced emphasis on 
small details in the relation of the churches, one to another. 
To divert the attention of society from basic moral truths to 
unimportant differences in ritual, seemed to Spinoza to be ex-
tremely dangerous. Consequently he determines, as the only 
way to lessen the danger, that no sect should be permitted to 
intrude any of its peculiar beliefs into the affairs of gov-
ernment. 
Royce explains this position of Spinoza and the pur-
pose of his state quite precisely: 
In a single sentence the sum of the 
whole is: it is not the ultimate purpose 
of government to rule, nor to put men un-
der the restraint of fear, nor to subject 
them to external authority; but on the con-
trary to free everyone from fear, and to 
secure him his life, his natural right to 
existence, and that apart from any hurt to 
himself or to another.l 
Royce believes the Tractate to be one of the best 
results of a political philosophy based on the naturalistic 
1 Royce, FE, 298. 
---13---
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assumptions current in the seventeenth century. 
Royce does not anywhere attempt to interpret Spinoza's 
entire complicated system. Rather, he uses the principle of 
selection, and from Spinoza's philosophical system he chooses 
only those parts the interpretation of which seem essential 
to him. Royce treats the religious aspect of Spinoza, not 
only because it is consistent with the mathematical precision 
of the century, but because it is also unusual in respect to 
the cold reasoning of the time in its almost passionate nature. 
Spinoza's political theory and the content of the Tractate 
have been selected because they indicate the naturalistic 
revolt of the time against the influences of theological tra-
dition. It would seem, therefore, that Royce interprets 
Spinoza in this selective manner for one reason mainly---
that is, to show the general trend of seventeenth century 
philosophy. It might be remarked that Royce takes obvious 
pleasure in illustrating this trend by the theories of a 
lonely Jew who was denounced as a heretic by his own race. 
==========#==================~==~--~--=-======~-=-=-====-=-=-================~ ---··· --·. 
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CHAPTER III 
JOSIAH ROYCE'S INTF.RPRETATIOt: OF BERKELEYl 
The thinkers of the eighteenth century turned from 
the naturalism of the previous period to a new sort of hum-
o.nism. Emphasis was placed on the mind of man rather than 
on the problems of the outer world. While the mathematical 
naturalists had used reason as an instrument by which to 
solve the problems of the physical sciences, the new humanists 
swung about to ex~ine reason itself with a critical attitude. 
The reaction to naturalism result~d in a detailed study of 
the inner world, and was termed by Royce, in his Spirit of 
Modern Philosophy, "the rediscovery of the inner life."2 
It cannot be said that Royce treats Berkely with a great 
degree of seriousness. The contribution of the "ever-fnsci-
nating Bishop Berkeley"3 is called by Royce a. "grandly simple 
accomplishment. u4 Royce pictures Berkeley as one of those 
young, enthusiastic thinkers, musing gently and prettily on 
this or that inspiration, keeping the sweeter musings for 
their own private enjoyment. A child of Plato, Royce calls 
Berkeley, who sees God with no fear, and tells of his marvelous 
l Royce's chief discussions of Berkeley may be found in the 
following books: Royce, SMP, 86-93; Royce, WI, I, 246-247; 
Royce, VII, II, 234-237. This chapter is based on the mateP-
ial cited. 
2 Royce, SHP, 68 
==========~i=====~3~Ibid~~71~====~====~==4=-~~~817==============-
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experience skillfully and charmingly in terse, sensitive 
0 essays. 
Because Berkeley states his idealism so simply, his 
works are well-liked by the young students of philosophy, 
says Royce. Upon first reading one would think Berkeley 
wildly paradoxical and quite opposed to common sense. Upon 
further reading one would marvel at the clarity and charm 
of his system. Still later one would think: how very obvious 
all this is, everyone thinks these thinGS· Royce holds that 
one's mood changes many times upon studying the works of the 
poetic Berkeley. 
Why, then, if Berkeley has this fickle effect upon 
Royce's mood, does Royce treat him at all! Berkeley's im-
portnnce lies in his position on the period concerned with 
the rediscovery of the inner life. He observed that the world 
of experience and the world of sense had within them no dis-
coverable substance at all. Royce uses the example of a 
fruit to explain Berkeley' a position: all we know of this 
fruit, ita taste, emell,r~nppearance, and so forth, is our 
idea of it. The taste does not seem to be there unless we 
are experiencing it. Royce believes that the importance 
of Berekeley's position lies in the fact that the analysis 
of the inner life is carried into a new field---the process 
of knowledge. Dealing with the problem of vision at an 
=:_-===-:::-= '-=-================········ 
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early date, Berkeley claimed that he really didn't see dis-
tance at all, only the signs of it. Blueness, smallness, 
haziness of a distant object are only manifestations of 
its distance. Distance and solidity are both read as a 
language, and experience teaches one to read this langue.ge. 
This reading is merely the putting together, rationally, of 
the ideas produced in us by the world. Up to this point, 
what Berkeley elaine is obviously true, says Royce, but 
Berkeley goes still farther. Whose language is this! Things 
would have no existence at all when no-one thinks them, un-
less these things are constantly in tho mind of a great e-
tarnal being. This being is Berkeley's God. God forces on 
our minds, according to Berkeley, the succession of our 
ideas, and we are further impressed by the words of our 
fellow-beings, vrho seem also to be learning this language; 
of God. 
This theology of Berkeley's is, Royce claims, a 
realistic theology, for Berkeley's God, in relation to 
experience which is merely an assertion and only possible, 
is a real, independent power, reflected by the souls of men. 
Royce thinks this realistic theology is faulty in Berkeley's 
thought •1 
1 Royce, WI, I, 247. 
0 
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In his discussion of the fourth conception of Being, 
Royce contrasts his theory with that of Berkeley, nnd says 
more of Berkeley's realistic theology: 
Berkeley was, with regard to the ma-
terial world, an idealist, although he 
viewed the existence and relations of in-
dividual minds in a fashion which seems 
to me to be·essentially realistic, since 
the Spirits of his world are entities ap-
parently conceived as, in their essence, 
logically independent of one another, nnd 
as linked merely through laws of cavsation 
and through Over-ruling Providence.· 
Berkeley does agree with t~e usual view or the ideal-
ist in believing that material substance does not exist with-
out minds. But, Royce objects, when Berkeley goes on to say 
that matter is only an appearance, with no basis other than 
the experience and ideas of men, and the influence of God 
upon these experiences and ideas, Berkeley's position seems 
precarious. For, if matter appears only to minds in the 
form of ideas, which ideas are ordained by God, there would 
be no material world existent at all, were God not real and 
His influence on the minds or men other the.n it is, or were 
meu organized in any other manner. 
Royce does not, in his own theory, reduce Nature 
to something so abstract as Berkeley's Nature. Nature is 
1 Royce, WI, II, 234. 
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something quite real to Royce. 
And we do not suppose with Berkeley 
that Nature has existence solely in our 
human experience, in the valid laws of 
succession which govern our experiences, 
and in the purpose of a Providence which 
is directly ~roducing in us the experience 
in question. 
The lin1i ted range of extra-human life, which Royce 
considers as existing concretely with only a universal iden-
tity with the Absolute, is suggested to us by the experience 
which we have of Nature .. 'l'he life of Nature, to Royce, is 
essentially different from the human life, the relation be-
tween the two being brought about by communication and link-
age betv1een events occurring in the various realms of Nature. 
Thus, unlike Berkeley, Royce's Nature is nothing illusory, 
but quite real, despite the fact that present experience 
hints quite inadequately as to the true reality of the inner 
life of Nature. To Royce,· Nature exists in the same relation 
to the Absolute that all life, however large or small, exists 
---identical with the Absolute Life in a universal sense. 
As I have stated before, Royce treats Berkeley in 
a highly selective manner, simply narrating Berkeley's spi-
ritual experience to illustrate one step in the procedure 
of eighteenth century philosophy. Royce uses Berkeley's 
1 Royce, VII, II, 236. 
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theory of Nature as a contrast to his own fourth conception 
of Being. To Royce, then, Berkeley's significan~ lies in 
his part in the rediscovery of the inner life. Berkeley 
was not at all revolutionary, according to Royce, nor was 
he by any means the great speculative thinker that some 
would have him. Royce ranks him as the third of the great 
British speculative thinkers, placing Hobbes and Hume before 
him in importance, respectively. Berkeley's work seemed 
to Royce to lack deep research and elaboration, although 
the easy flow and poetical nature of his essays deceive 
the young rea.der. 
In that he, along with others of his century, was 
dissatisfied with the cold mathematics of the preceding era, 
and turned inward for contemplation, treating life with a 
confidential, humane attitude, Berkeley is significant. 
Royce's attitude toward Berk~ley may be summed up in one 
word; Royce terms Berkeley's idealism "preparatory."! 
1 Royce, SMP, 351. 
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CHAPTER IV 
JOSIAH ROYCE'S INTERPRETATION OF KANTl 
Royce's treatment of Kant, the man, is extremely 
sympathetic in its tone. He pictures Kant as a kindly 
old bachelor, whose life was so systematic in its regular-
ity of habit, that the neighbors set their clocks by his 
movements. Royce quotes a remark of Heine's which comments 
on the paradox in this strange man's nature---a kindly neigh-
bor, a gentle old bachelor, yet a philosopher who merciless-
ly destroyed a world of thought. Royce says cf him: 
This odd and gentle little man was, as 
you already see, a singular combination of 
the keen-witted analyst and the humane lov-
er of all things human.2 
Kant' a philosophy ia considered by Royce as most 
difficult to study. Kant seems to have aroused more aug-
gestions than any other thinker. His philosophy has often 
been called dangerous, which is a most inviting challenge 
to the young student of philosophy. Royce himself admits 
that he was seriously baffled by the Critigue of Pure Reason, 
and more than once has found that he had misinterpreted Kant. 
1 Royce's chief discussions of Kant may be found in the 
following books: Royce: SMP, 103-139; Royce, LMI, 1-62; 
Royce, va, I, 233-238. This chapter is based on the 
material cited. 
2 Royce, SMP, 109. 
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Despite the difficulties in the Critigue, Royce says that 
it is "nearly, if not quite, the most important philosoph-
ical treatise ever written."l 
The essential doctrine of the Critigue is that man's 
nature is the true creator of man's world, according to 
Royce's interpretation. 
When rightly interpreted, Kant's world 
where the inner reason is lord over the 
outer sense, will prove to be as hard and 
fast a world of fact, of law, and of eter-
nal majesty, as ever the seventeenth cen-
tury had conceived.2 
In presenting the idea that man is the source of 
the laws of nature, Kant meant that the external world isn't 
the deepest truth, but the inner structure of the soul which 
manifests itself in nature. Royce says that the main inter-
est of this presentation is the mercilessly clever resource-
fulness of Kant's treatment. 
In discussing Kant's religious belief, Royce admits 
that he disagrees with several critics who have treated this 
side of Kant. Heine, for instance, believes Kant's religious 
life to be divided into three definite periods; the first, a 
period of faith, the second, a revolutionary period, and the 
third, a period of ti1·ed withdrawal from the conflict. This 
l Royce, SUP, 34. 
2 Ibid., 35. 
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theory of Heine's, Royce believes, is not at all true. Royce 
emphatically holds that Kant's religious beliefs remained 
quite consistent throughout his life. 
Royce compares the religion of Kant to that of Spi-
noza. While Spinoza adhered to the mystical belief, as a 
comfort to him in his disillusionment, Kant attached himself 
to that other group of worshippers, the striving, active 
exponents of the Religion of Duty. Kant would have nothing 
of the sentimental or the mystic. Therefore he could know 
nothing of Spinoza's mystical adoration of the Eternal. 
Kant, this genial and bloodless old 
hero of contemplation, wasting away in 
his cheerful asceticism, reverences, as 
everyone knows, duty and the stars, but 
hns no time for ror:1ance.1 
Kant's God is lofty and majestic, with no liking 
for sentimentality. Kant's God's revelation is to the con-
science. conscience shows us the moral law. One must act 
always as though God were constantly present in one's con-
science. This is what Kant calls postulating God's existence. 
one believes in God because a man sure of the right knows 
that the right should win, and since the right. is surely 
not the victor in the sense-world, there must be a God at 
the head of a vast universe in which the right does actually 
conquer. If you wish him to be, God is a certainty in your 
l Royce, SMP, 112. 
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own consciousness. Royce holds that Kant is no optimist, 
for Kant certainly is aware of much evil about him, and 
even makes fun of the man who pretends to enjoy this life. 
The only good thing in this world, in Kant's estimation, 
P.oyce points out, is a person with a strong will to do his 
duty. Kant, then, gives us faith as an active postulate. 
Kant certainly is sure that he will win, but neither 
experience nor intuition tell him this. He is actively, 
manfully positive that he will win. Royce compares him to 
an army going into battle with set teeth and a will to win, 
no matter what the odds. Truth comes as we ourselves make 
it. 
In the Soirit of Modern Philooophy, Royce traces 
Kant's reflective fortunes. This Kant, says Royce, was 
extremely self-critical and "skeptical above all me~ ... l 
He formulated ideas early in his career, only to break 
them down and discard them later. Kant was full of the 
tradition of the preceding century when he first began 
his contemplation. Reason, formal and logical, was the 
master over all thinking. Science, however, fascinated 
Kant, and after extensive study in this field, the thought 
came to him that perhaps, after all, logical philosophy 
did not give place to a real world. Thus, stimulated by 
1 Royce, SMP, 119. 
==~-------==#===========================~= =====-====-===--· 
---24---
I 
I 
his scientific study, Kant began his search for truth, only 
e to become discouraged many times because of his merciless 
self-criticism. 
Finally he came to the conclusion, Royce shows us, 
that all the truth of the physical world depends on the truth 
of time and space. Laws of matter must conform to laws of space, 
but laws of space do not have to conform to laws o~ matter. 
Space and time are paradoxical and self-contradictory. Space 
isn't real at all, but just an idea, for it is both infinitely 
divisible and not infinitely divisible. Kant calls this doctrine 
the ideality of time and space. As an example of the meaning 
of Kant, Royce describes our relation to time and space as com-
parable to our view of the worlci through rose-colored glasses---
when we wear rose-colored glasses the world appears to be the 
color of rose, but when we wear green glasses the world appears 
to be green. Time and space are only conditions of our sense-
understanding of things. So they are not real, but are facts 
in our own consciousness. This theory of Kant's led to his 
later assumption that things in themselves are unknowable, says 
Royce. We are aware of things through the medium of our sen-
ses, but cannot tell what they are since our senses cut us off 
from the chance of knowing. 
It was Hume, Royce tells us, who gave Kant the final 
impetus that resulted in the transcendental deduction of the 
---25---
categories. Hume had stated that the facts in the world are 
only conjoined but not really connected. In answer Kant 
said, the transcendental unity of apperception, which is 
rational consciousness, involves self-recognition, which means 
the binding of fact to experience. The difference between the 
sane and the inaane man, Royce illustrates, is that the sane 
man binds his impressions and ideas together in orderly fash-
ion, while the insane man cannot do this. And since the world 
is what we make it with our ideas of it, then the sane man's 
world io a world of connected facts after all. 
If I am myself, as I think I am, then the phenomena 
of my world will follow the truth of my categories. A table, 
illustrates Royce, is a fact in my sense world of space and 
time, ani must agree with tha:t which I have seen before, be-
cause I am myself and my experience must be coherent. Therefore 
I make out of this object, because of what my experience tells 
me, a table. But this process is performed almost unconscious-
ly by the sane man. This process Kant calls constructive im-
agination, which builds on the foundation of our sense exper-
iences. Royce says that this process "builds our world as a 
genius mnkes a poem."1 
Thus we have a right to believe in great faiths which 
1 Royce, SMP, 130. 
• 
'> 
' 
' 
---26---
I 
----::-- .~-:-. .:.-:_===== lc\c: =.==-===.--==c-==-==-====c:.======-c=--=--:-c-===-- .:=-:-_--,-_-_=:..: . .:..--_--_--:=-=.. .. :___-_-_-_-_--__ :-·: _--:_··-::=:.-:_-_-==-= =._----::__ --~---~-_ .. _----=-~ 
cannot be proved, claims Kant. The theoretical view of 
things is morally not enough. Therefore we must postulate 
God over and above it. 
The unknown things in themselves give 
us sense experiences. These we first 
perceive in forms of space and time, be-
cause that is our way of perceiving. 
Then, being coherent creatures, we order 
this our world of sense according to the 
laws of causation and the other categor-
ies which are forms of thought. Thus we 
all alike get a world, which, while it is 
in all its sanity and order an inner world, 
is still for each of us an outer world---
a world of fact, a world of life.l 
Kant•a moral law, Royce, touches briefly. Kant 
believes the moral law to be rigidly correct. To do right 
means to Kant, to do as you would, if what you did were 
to be made a universal law. Kant dislikes submission to an 
absolute plan, says Royce. Rayher he trusts in the certain-
ty of the moral law. Universality of action, meaning, act-
ing in a universal manner with an outlook that is universal, 
is Kant's belief. 
Absolute truthfulness, absolute respect 
for the rights and freedom of everyone of 
your fello\vmen, utter devotion to the cause 
of high-mindedness, of honesty, of justice, 
of simplicity, of honor,---sucp is Kant's 
ideal---:t 
That Kant's moral outlook is rigid, Royce admits, 
1 Royce, SMP, 131. 
2 ~·· 133. 
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but that it is sincere he never doubts. 
This is, indeed, the wonder of Kant, 
that, born and reared in the lliidst of 
pedantry, a mere man of books, a systew-
maker, a metaphysician, he would still 
express the very heart of the high-minded 
man of the world.l 
Kant was chiefly a critical philosopher, says Royce. 
He believed that ·the contrast between the success of the 
empirical sciences and the failure of metaphysics is one 
to be understood, not condoned. Conse-quently he makes a 
systematic inquiry into the nature and limits of hmne.n 
knowledge. 
The general answer to the question, what are men 
fitted to know, is usually the same, Kant held. We know on-
ly what our experiences teach us---this is the probable an-
ewer. And this reply would explain the failute of metaphy-
sics, for the metaphysician seeks for the ultimate truth, 
and experience does not present things to us in that way 
at all. 
Kant thought this account to be quite true, but in-
complete, Royce points out. There are two reasons for Kant's 
cl·iticism. First, this explanation does not adequately de-
fine experience. Second, there is no account in this theory 
l Royce, SHP, 118 • 
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of the results of the combination of reason and experience 
which are not mere facts of experience. The theory thut 
Royce is discussing here is that of Hume, and Kant casts 
aside this empirical explanation. 
Kant believes that the conditions upon which ex-
perience depends are not empirical at all, but a priori, 
and to be found through an analysis of the process of 
knowledge. When we examine these conditions of experience 
we learn of nothing ultimate, nothing that exists beyond the 
knowing self. Therefore metaphysical knowledge of things 
beyond the self is impossible, claims Kant. 
Royce points out that the empirical facts which 
we believe to be true are of two kinde, according to Kant. 
The first kind are present perceptions, or the presant ac-
tiona on your senses. The second kind of empirical facts 
are called conceptual constructions. Illustrations of 
this second kind are given by Royce; the acceptance of the 
moon's existence with no knowledge at all as to what is on 
the other side of it, and tornorrow's happenings. We ac-
cept as true the fact that the moon is really in the sky, 
yet we know very little about it. The same with tomorrow's 
happenings---we know there wi~l be a tomorrov1 full of events, 
but how do we know! 
- -- ---- --- - ------ - . --
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When is experience not experience? 
The answer is: When its facts are what 
most of your acknowledged facts of the 
realm of experience nearly always are, 
namely, conceptual constructions.l 
There are two aspects to these conceptual construe-
tions, Royce points out. First, in forming them we employ 
time, space and the categories. Something remains constant 
wherever change occurs; this is the category of substance. 
Events are always caused ~/ universal laws; this is the 
category of causation. 
The second aspect to conceptual constructions is 
that we link our conceptions of invisible phenomena with our 
present experience, making a unity. Conceptual constructions 
are possible experiences of mine. 
Royce points out quite carefully that nowhere does 
Kant hold this unity of consciousness to be anything abso-
lute or superhuman. Kant meant it to be merely human intel-
ligence. Conceptual constructions must be related to cate-
gories, and then must be regarded as possible experiences. 
Royce says that in the deduction of the categ~ries 
Kant tries to prove that all natural events must conform 
tonconditions of our intelligence, according to the transcen-
dental unity of apperception. Natural facts are phenomena 
1 Royce, LMI, 18. 
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and would not. be thus if no~no was aware of them. All 
phenomena must conform to laws of unity of consciousness. 
Kant's deduction of the categories made known four 
thoughts, according to Royce. First, we only know things as 
they appear to us. Second, we can know through contempla-
tion the conditions upon which knowledge depends. These 
conditions are time, space, and the categories. 'rhird, a 
priori forms are useless except as they fill in the out lines 
of experience. This is all they are capable of doing. Fourth, 
we think of all our experience as a unity, related ·to cate-
gories and possible experience, time, space, etc. 
We can know only such phenomena as are 
fit to be known---an expression which con-
tains Kant' a whole deduction in a nutshell.l 
It is interesting to note that the table of cate-
gories precipitated investigation und criticism by the 
post-Kantians. They examined each category in its own or-
der in an effort to find out just why rationality insists 
upon specific categories. Time and space were, to Kant, 
irreducible, and apart from the categories; yet when the 
post-Kantians completed their rigid examination they found 
time and space to be much closer in relation to the cate-
gories than Kant kad adnutted---in fact, even definable 
l Royce, LUI, 48. 
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in terms of the categories. 
Of the deduction of the categories Royce says the 
following: "the Kantian deduction of the categories is the 
portal to the dwelling of modern philosophy. nl 
According to Royce, Kant truly believed that there 
are things in themselves, existing in a byond, transcending 
the senses, and apart from the knowledge of man. We our-
selves belong to that world of things in themselves. Our 
consciousness never shows us that we are real, and yet that 
we ~ real is not to be doubted. We ourselves are rooted 
in something outside of present consciousness, and are real 
in quite a different sense than physical or mental phenom-
ena are real. Consequently, my true self is not the self 
of which I am aware through my consciousness, but a deeply 
grounded will, the present of which is indicated by my do-
ings in the world of phenomena. Royce asserts that Kantn 
ethical philosophy made this view particularly noticeable. 
Here Kant asks us to regard our inner selves. We cannot 
truly know our real self, and yet know that we have one. 
Kant holds that we do possess a true self which is real and 
unknowable. One says, "I did this," and believes it. This 
is Kant's postulate of the freedom of will. Now, exactly as 
in his ethics he believes there is a true ego, so he believes 
1 Royce, LUI, 5. 
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that there exist things in themselves, without which we 
would have no basis upon which to organize our ideas. 
Kant's followers find this unstable. Royce's objec-
tion is as follows: it is one thing to say that we know things 
as they appear to us, but quite another to say that we know 
there are real things which do not appear to us an~ nP.ver 
wi 11. Ho\v can we know so much and yet so little about these 
things in themselves! 
Kant's "marvelously subtle thought"l started a con-
troversy such as has bean rarely equalled in philosophy. 
In one respect, however, all the post-Kantian idealists 
agreed; they desired to revise the deduction of the cate-
gories. 
To deduce the categories from the nature 
of the self, and in doing so, to reduce them 
all, and, if possible, the whole of philo-
sophy to a system of results derived from 
a single principle---this undertaking con-
sequently became, for the post-Kantians, a 
characteristic ideal.2 
l Royce, SMP, 132. 
2 Royce, LMI, 49. \ 
:::=::::::::====H====================-------
I 
I 
---33---
CHAPI'ER V 
JOSIAH ROYCE'S INTERPRETATION OF HEGELl 
Of all philosophers, Hegel's character seems to be 
the least impressive to Royce. The only glory that should 
come to Hegel, according to Royce, is that which arises from 
the results of his work, for as a man Hegel was not all that 
could be desired. He was neither a patriot, nor a dreamer, 
nor a poet, and he used his friends for his own advantage. 
Wily and masterful in his relations with his fell~, he was 
1\ 
merciless toward those who opposed him, and genial to those 
who flattered his vanity. 
To the end he remains a self-seekin~, 
determined, laborious, critical, unaffec-
tionnte man, faithful to his of!'ice and to 
his household, loyal to his employers, cru-
el to his foes.2 
As to Hegel's style, Royce marvels at his great 
accuracy, and depth of original skill, but says that his 
style "is notoriously one of the moat barbarous, technical, 
and obscure in the whole history of philosophy."3 Royce 
does not think that this complicated method of exposition 
1 Royce's chief discussions of Hegel may be found in the 
following books: Royce, SUP, 194T227;Royce, UU, 136-231. 
This chapter is based on the material cited. 
2 Royce, SMP, 196. 
3 Ibid., 196. 
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is a mere misfortune, but believes that Hegel deliberately 
chose to make his style difficult. Hegel never did appear 
to enjoy proceeding over an easy road. 
But Hegel's type is one of the rarest, 
the one, namely, whose representative man 
will, so to speak, tell you in a few pre-
ternaturally accurate, though perhaps high-
ly technical words, all that you ever did, 
who will seem to sound your heart very much 
as a skillful specialist in nervous diseas-
es would sound the mysterious and secret 
depths of a morbid patient's consciousness; 
but who, all the while, is apparently as 
free fro~ deep and personal experiences 
of an emotional type as the physician is 
free from his patient's morbid and nervous 
web-spinning.l 
Not a trace of a deeper inner experience of any.1sort may 
be found in Hegel's diary. He seems to be almost complete-
ly objective, Royce observes. 
Hegel was not content with leaving things as Kant 
had, and merely saying that philosophy depends upon who and 
what we are. He tries to analyze the matter, and thus ere-
ates his theory of the nature of self-consciousness. 
Royce shows us that to Hegel the paradox of con-
sciousness is; we know wlmt is happening to us this minute, 
although we can only guess as to the past and future, yet 
even as we try to tell what it is that is occurring in the 
present moment, that instant has passed, the note has sounded 
1 Royce, Sl!P, 199. 
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and died, and we cannot say that we know, but must say that 
we just knew. How, if the instant has passed, can we know 
the experience at all! We constantly change our minds. We 
know only if we realize the presence of another self of the 
past moment. ~or an example of this paradox Royce says, we 
do not really know that we are happy at the precise moment when 
we are happy. We can only reflect on it afterwards. We re-
view happiness. We do not even know who we are at any moment, 
we only know what we were. 
This paradox is not only to be found in moments, 
Royce points out next in his treatment of Hegel's conscious-
ness, but is existent in all of life. Life exists inasmuch 
as we can contemplate upon it from a distance. Youth, for 
instance, Royce says, is never fully appreciated nor under-
stood until one reflects on it in maturity. "My exi stance 
is in a sort of conscious publicity of my inner life."l 
One thought that Royce believes struck Hegel with 
much force is the fact that, left alone to ourselves we 
shrive 1 and become nothing at all but atoms. There is an 
analogy here, Royce points out, between the paradox of the 
inner life and social life. A life of loneliness is empty. 
As far as my inner life goes I live only if I reflect on 
l Royce, SMP, 207. 
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my past experiences. The only way I exist in social life 
is in relation to my fellow beings. All awareness is de-
pendent on other consciousnesses. "Spirituality is just 
intercourse, communion of spirits."l Spirituality exists by 
a sort of diffusion into opposing forces. The struggle and 
conflict are the roots of the deeper self; this is the basis 
of Hegel's system, Royce holds. Royce s~ys of the differen-
tiation of consciousness: 
As the warrior reJo~ces in the foeman 
worthy of his steel, and rejoices in him 
just because he wants to overcome him and 
to slay him; as courage exists by triumph 
over terror, and as there is no courage 
in a world where there is nothing terrible; 
as strength consists in the mastery of ob-
stacles, as even love is proved only through 
suffering, grows deep only when sorrow was 
with it, becomes often the tenderer because 
it is wounded by misunderstanding; so, in 
short, everywhere in conscious life, con-
sciousness is a union, an organization, of 
conflicting aims, purposes, thoughts, stir-
rings. And just this, according to Hegel, 
is the very perfection of consciousness.2 
The Absolute, to Hegel, is the lord over all this 
conflict, a lord of war, who comprehends all and who wins 
the final victory. The absolute exists within the conflict. 
Hegel, as we see, makes his Absolute, 
the Lord, most decidedly a man of war. 
Consciousness is paradoxical, restless, 
struggling. Weak souls get weary of the 
fight, and give up trying to get wisdom, 
·skill, virtue, because all these are won 
only in the presence of the enemy. But 
l Royce, SMP, 208. 
2 Ibi~. , 212. 
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the absolute self is simply the absolute-
ly strong spirit who bears the contradic-
tions of life, and \tins the eternal vic-
tory.l 
Here, too, the paradox of consciousness must be 
followed in order to understand the Absolute. In order to 
become aware of what I truly am, I must enlarge myself 
through relationships and conflict, in a sort of evolution, 
until I come to know the Absolute as the inner core of my 
life. The realization must come to me that I am one with 
the Eternal. 
The Absolute is essentially a self---
not any one individual human self, but a 
completely self-determined being, of whom 
our varied individuality is an expression.2 
Royce points out that Hegel attempted to solve all 
the other problems of philosophy by the recognition of this 
same paradoxical opposition. Of Hegel's task of solving the 
problems of philosophy in this manner, Royce says, "this 
stupendous undertaking was but indifferently executed."3 
Royce tells us that to Hegel the cons~iousness of 
finite life takes three forms: art, which illustrates the 
union of the finite and the infinite by presenting an ob-
j act which expresses an ideal which is absolute; religion, 
which shows this same knowledge on a higher plane, and 
1 Royce, SMP, 214. 
2 Royce, LJ..U, 226. 
· 3 Royce, SMP, 218. 
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philosophy, which realizes the necessity of an Absolute 
Being, active and rational. 
Royce calls Hegel "a modern Aristotle"l because 
he tries to unify the total results of human knowledge • 
. Parallel to his belief that the dialectical method is the 
only sound method, is Hegel's assertion that error is an 
essential part of absolute truth. In the Phaenomenologi~ 
Hegel states that whatever is truly essential is in the 
world for some good reason. 
By the dialectical method, Hegel expounds his theory 
of logic. He believes that definition alone cannot be said 
to tell the truth of a conception; only by considering con-
stant flux, conflict, ebb and flow of life, can problems be 
solved. In the Logic, he tries to put thought into an organ-
ic system. To Hegel, the laws of thought are the souls of 
all things. Royce does not seem to think Hegel's logic to 
be the best part of his system by any means. 
There are in recent philosophy two He-
gels: one the uncompromising idealist, with 
his general and fruitful insistence upon the 
great fundamental truths of idealism; the 
other the technical Hegel of the Logik, 
whose dialectical method seems destined 
to remain, not a philosophy, but the idea 
of a philosophy. With this latter Hegel 
the author feels a great discontent ..••• 2 
l Royce, LMI, 214. 
2 Royce, RAP, X. 
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I1ost people, says Royce, call Hegel cold and rigid, 
logical and dead. But Royce himself would not characterize 
him in quite this way. That Hegel dealt with the paradoxes 
of the spiritual life in a very complete, understanding man-
ner, Royce is quite sure. 
His great philosophical and systema-
tic error lay, not in introducing logic 
into passion, but in conceiving the logic 
of passion as the only logic, so that you 
in vain endeavor to get satisfaction from 
Hegel's treatment of outer nature, of sci-
ence, of mathematics, or of any coldly the-
oretical topic. About all these things he 
is immensely suggestive, but never final.l 
By the logic of passion Royce means Hegel's dialec-
tical method. Roycd holds that Hegel, in looking at anything, 
sees in it self-conscious strife. This analysis which Hegel 
makes of self-consciousness, this excellent description of 
spiritual life and human passion, has in it much of value, 
and yet, Royce asks, does it, as a system, explain nnture 
or science to a satisfactory degree! Believing·'that the 
logic of passion would explain tho nature and solution of 
not only spirit, human and absolute, but of every philosoph-
ical probler;1, was Hegel's mistake, according to Royce. 
To Royce, the most characteristic part of the Hegel-
ian doctrine is the theory of concrete universals. It is 
1 Royce, SUP, 226. 
: -==-=~11-====--=======-"-·-
1 
\ 
i 
r 
i 
\ 
J 
:~ 
.\ 
---40---
throueh this theory that Hegel tries to cone to the unifica-
tion of all things into one great universal. In this manner 
he tries to overcome dualism and create a philosophy which 
is complete in one great Absolute. 
---41---
Cff...APTER VI 
COHCLUSIONSl 
The preceding chapters consist of an account of 
Royce's interpretations of four important thinkers in 
the hi story of modern philosophy. It may be seen quite 
readily that Royce does not attempt to make a thorough 
analysis of the entire systems of these thinkers, for Royce 
does not intend to be an historian. Rather he selects from 
the theories of Spinoza, Berkeley, Kant and Hegel just those 
assertions which he can most practically use in the exposi-
tion of his own philosophy. There are, however, certain 
criticisms to be made on Royce's treatment, as well as some 
comments to be made concerning the relationship of his own 
system to those of the men whon he interprets. 
Royce's interpretation of Spinoza deals with the 
religious aspect of Spinoza and his ethical and political 
theories. The mystical religious passion of Spinoza is 
treated in a most sympathetic manner by Royce. He pictures 
Spinoza as a lonely and wonderful figure, lost in his adora-
1 It would be impossible to footnote these conclusions com-
pletely and adequately. They are the result or ideas 
gleaned from lectures on the history of philosophy by 
Alban G. Widgery of Duke University, from various lectures 
by Dr. E.S. Brightman at Boston University, and from read-
ing in various histories of philosophy, all of which are 
c=====W====~·~.;n ..e:luded-in-the=Bihliographp -
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tion of the Eternal. It is interesting to note, however, that 
despite his sympathy for Spinoza.'s mysticism, Royce discards 
the mystical theory of being in his examination of the histor-
ical concepts.! He charges that the mystical view is entire-
ly too abstract because o·f its subjectivity. The mystic, 
Royce holds, makes no attempt to grasp the idea of the ex-
tarnal. Royce's own theory of being is a unity of the ex-
tarnal and the internal, in which the external carries out 
the purpose of the internal meaning. One cannot see the 
entire fulfilment of the internal idea in the experience of 
the here and now, Royce holds, and therefore there must be 
some all-seeing mind that witnesses the larger campletion 
of meaning.2 
Royce fails to mention the fact that, though he 
pretends to be a rationalist, Spinoza really relies upon 
empiricism in his description of Substance. Spinoza be-
longed to the seventeenth century, a time when reason pre-
vailed above all else. Of the philosophy of this century 
Royce says, "it founds its loyalty, indeed, upon reason."3 
Yet Spinoza, the cold rationalist, depends upon experience 
when he names the attributes of Substance as being bodily 
substance and thinking substance. Royce does not seem to 
1 Royce, WI, I, 186-195. 
2 Ibid., 345-470. 
3 ~e, SMP, 30. 
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regard this as significant at all. Spinoza states that the 
attributes of Substance are infinite in nuober, and yet can 
mention only two. And why does he mention only these par-
ticular two attributes! The only answer seems to be that 
Spinoza selected these knowable phases of Substance because 
he had experienced them as an empiricist. 
There is, perhaps, a slight analogy to be found in 
the Absolutes of Spinoza and Royce. Spinoza bases his re-
ligious belief on the axiom that whatever cannot be explained 
by its own nature must be explained by some higher nature 
which causes it to be what it is. In the same manner Royce, 
when he sees that the meaning of the internal cannot be ful-
filled in present experience, turns to a higher mind which 
can explain and see the internal idea. Santayana says of 
Royce---and this might well have been said of Spinoza too---
If the impression he left on your mind 
was vague, this ~as partly because, in spite 
of his comprehensiveness, he seemed to view 
everything in relation to something else that 
remained untold.l 
When he interprets Spinoza's theory of government, 
Royce clarifies his account by comparing the theories of 
Spinoza and Hobbes. Both thinkers start off by consider-
ing man's nature to be innately selfish, but while Hobbes 
1 Santayana, COUS, 98. 
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adheres to this characteristic of man as the basis for even 
his political theory, Spinoza parts company with him, and 
attributes an instinct of self-sacrifice to man's inner 
self. Consequently, as a reason for the protection of the 
state against revolution---which both Hobbes and Spinoza 
regard as hazardous---Hobbes holds that man's innate eel-
fishness will frustrate any such attempt to overthrow the 
governing power for the simple reason that punishment or 
political chaos, whichever the result of the revolt would 
be, would prove much more bothersome than the existing po-
litical system. Royce, as has been said, considers this 
view of Hobbes,' to be quite gloomy. As a result Spinoza's 
reason, namely, that government is a public habit and habits 
are hard to change, looked much more optimistic to Royce, 
who welcomes this more pleasant outlook after the pessimism 
of Hobbes' opinion of man's nature. It does seem that Royce 
misses the absurdity of Spinoza's soporific assertion. For 
if' the mere fact that habit is hard to change were sufficient 
reason for Spinoza's assurance of the stability of his gov-
ernment, then surely there would be little hope for improve-
ment of conditions, either social or political. What possible 
hope would there be for Christianity or for any social reforms; 
if' Spinoza's attitude were commendable! Progress itself is 
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little more than a matter of breaking outworn habits and 
reestablishing the order of things. It seems upon reflection 
that Spinoza's outlook is even gloomier than Hobbes'. Possi-
bly one explanation for Spinoza's strange attitude might be 
the fact that he led such a secluded life that he was unable 
to cope with political and social problems as adequately as 
under other conditions. Royce does speak of a limitation in 
this respect, although he does not enlarge upon it: 
One limitation remains, however, es-
pecially noteworthy in Spinoza's case. 
His form of isolation renders him a poor 
critic of the deeper social relationshipa.l 
Royce has marveled, nevertheless, at the healthy 
outlook of Spinoza in spite of his isolation. This might 
be partially explained by a psychological factor. Spino-
za was isolated insofar as he was exiled from his own people 
and ignored by many Europeans because of his race. He did, 
however, enter into and enjoy the simple life of the people 
about him, and was reasonably serene in his relationships. 
Economic stress did not ruffle the serenity of his existence 
after his exile from the Jewish religion, and financial in-
dependence is a great aid to a happy understanding and tol-
eration, according to psychology. 
1 Royce, SMP, 45. 
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In the meanwhile he earned his ov.rn living 
by his skill as a practical optician, and 
was a burden to no-one. He thus accomplished 
one of the hardest of all tasks, viz., to be 
a prophet without being a prigi and to be a 
saint without being a sponger. 
Except for his position in the rediscovery of the 
inner life, Berkeley is not treated in detail by Royce. 
Berkeley represents to Royce a step in the history of ideal-
i am, and not a very important one as can be gathered by 
Royce's application of the epithet "preparatory"2 to Berke-
ley's idealism. It hardly seems that Royce has treated 
Berkeley with a proper degree of seriousness. 
It seems to me, however, that Berkeley 
has hardly received justice in this sketch. 
Grandly simple as was his thought, it was 
yet so deep that it was misunderstood by 
all the philosophers of his time. And 
although this system may appear to be 
one-sided and incomplete when compared 
with later expressions of idealism, we still 
have to rememoer that they are but fuller 
developments of that principle which he 
was the first to emphasize.3 
Thus Creighton speaks in his review of Royce's Spirit 
of Modern Philosophy. 
Berkeley's primary aim, mentioned by Royce 
but in passing, was to overthrow the theory of the 
l Broad, FTET, 51. 
2 Royce, SMP, 351. 
3 Phil. Rev., I, 323. 
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materialists. In order to do so, Berkeley reasoned, he 
must prove that material things are non-existent outside 
of the mind. 
In the midst of the philosophical 
and popular prejudice that Matter could 
do this or that---could make ~nds per-
ceive, and could even evolve from itself 
all the reason and rational life that 
exists---Berkeley loudly called for an 
answer to certain previous questions, 
the an~fers to which had been, and still 
were, too dogmatically asaumed.l 
It is interesting to note that the poetic Berkeley, 
whose greatest desire was to wipe out the skepticism and 
agnosticism characteristic of a materialistic era and to 
re-open the inner life, was, quite without his knowing it 
at all, a definite step in a three-fold movement toward 
pure skepticism which col!lmenced with Locke and ended in 
Hume. It is said of Berkeley: 
•••.. was really, against his own in-
tention, opening a door for the most tho-
rough-going skepticism and agnosticism 
ever offered to the world.2 
In dealing with Kant, Royce mentions the many move-
menta in philosophy which came out of Kant's system·~ but 
more might be said of this remarkable precipitation of con-
1 Fraser, Berkeley, 56. 
2 Ibid., 15. 
-
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troversies. 
Kant's philosophy has been termed a Copernican Rev-
olution, for the changes that he v~ought in the field of 
philosophy are almost as remarkable as the changes brought 
about in the astronomical revolution of that name. out of 
Kant's philosophy the following movements sprang up: the 
movement of classical German idealism in the nineteenth 
century with Schelling, Fichte and Hegel reaching the heights 
of idealism; the Common Sense School of Scottish thinkers 
who attempted to break down the skepticism of Hume; the 
idealistic movement in England started by Carlyle and Coler-
idge; the St_. Ouis movement which was prin1a.rily Hegelian and 
yet came indirectly out of Kant; the bombardment of the class-
ical idealists in Germany by Schopenhauer and the naturalists; 
and the American movements, Pragmatism and Personalism. 
A relationship between Kant's will and that of Royce 
can be seen. Both thinkers give will a definite place in 
their systems. 
Royce says l~ttle of Kant's limited belief in Know-
ledge. Kant destroys the cosmological, teleological, and 
ontological arguments for the existence of God by emphasizing 
the limitations of knowledge. Knowledge, for Kant, is due 
to the functioning of the mind; but God is not an object of 
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sense, nnd since most of our notions come to us through 
the medium of sense, YJe can have no real knowledge of God. 
Yet, he reasons, there are no arguments which can possibly 
prove that God cannot exist, and since it is essential to 
believe in God, why should we try to prove or disprove his 
existence! This argument in itself is formally fallacious, 
since it is an Argumentum ad Ignorati~un, the substitution 
of the mere lack of disproof for actual proof. 
Kant postulates his God. We all have the convic-
tion, he claims, that virtue and happiness ought to go to-
gather, likewise vice and misery. Since often in this world 
one does not accompany the other, then there must be another 
world, ruled over by a just God, in which world virtue and 
happiness do belong together. 
Thilly says of Royce's book, The Philosophy of Loyaltx, 
and the discussion therein of the existence of God: 
V/e have here a moral argument for the 
existence of God, oimilar to that presented 
in Kant's Critique of Practical Re~.l 
Royce does not discuss Kant's doctrine of Rationel 
Freedotl· Kant had two theories of Freedom, Rational Free-
dom and Neutral Freedom. The latter theory seems to be 
quite satisfactory from an ethical point of view, but the 
1 Thilly, HP, 561. 
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doctrine of Rational Freedor.1 seems to be unethical in i te 
implications. If a man is free only when he acts in accor-
dance with reason, as the theory states, a criudnal on tri-
al could say that he had not acted in a rational manner, and 
his crime would be excusable. This does not seem to oe eth-
ically stable. 
The natural and spiritual orders, the phy-
sical and the ooral orders, the divine and 
the human, the fatal and the free, may, accor-
ding to Roy~e, be reconciled on Kant's doctrine 
of the transcendental or extra-temporal free-
dom, and the temporal necessity of all our 
actions.l 
In his theory of moral obligation, Kant assumes 
that man is_ by nature double, in that he is sensuous, and 
at the aruma time a rational being.2 The rational nature 
of man is the more important aspect. This is somewhat 
similar to Royce's belief. 
Although his philosophy seems to be Hegelian in 
many respects, Royce refuses to acknowledge the influence 
of Hegel. 
He disclaimed the suggestion that 
he was a follower of Hegel and asserted 
that he found more resemblance between his 
own view and those of Schopenhauer.3 
1 Thilly, HP, 560. 
2 Broad, FTET, 135. 
3 Townsend, PIUS, 161. 
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Royce's alleged relation to Schopenhauer, which the students 
of Royce's philosophy fail to see, might explain to some 
extent the rather merciless treatmen·t which Royce gi vee to 
the character of Hegel. Schopenhauer wrote rather cruelly 
of Hegel, the man, and Royce, it seems, must have been famil-
iar[vlith this treatment, for hie own analysis of Hegel is 
not at all sympathetic. 
Hegel: 
Rogers says of the relationship between Royce and 
Josiah Royce .••• departs less 
widely from the Hegelian position. 
But by a new emphasis upon the teleo-
logical nature of the world whole, and 
a consequent getting away from pure in-
tcllectualisu, he represents what is 
essentially a new type of theory. In 
patticular, he has tried to s~e more 
accurately the problems of the nature 
of the individual, and to harmonize 
its reality, and especially its ethical 
reality, vdth a fundamental monism.l 
In a review of Royce's book, The Philosophy of Lol-
alty, it is said: 
The subject matter of the book is, 
broadly speaking, the content of the mo-
ral ideal. This for Professor Royce, as 
for Hegel, consists in the identification 
of the individual will with the universal 
will. 2 
Royce's resemblance to Hegel in several other theories 
1 Rogers, SHP, 505. 
2 Jour. Phil.,VI, 77. 
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is me.rked. 
His relation to Hegel is very close, 
though he rightly objected to being con-
sidered a disciple. He resembles Hegel 
in his reliance on the historical approach 
to philosophical problem~. in the conscious 
acceptance of metaphysics as the heart of 
philosophy, in the general employment of 
the dialectical method, and in the sweep 
of his constructive imagination.l 
Another noticeable relationship of Royce with Hegel 
is the belief, common to both, that logic and metaphysics 
are inseparable. 
As an interpreter of Hegel, Royce seems far more 
competent in his view on Hegel's Absolute than does William 
James. James sees Hegel's Absolute as a static, dead thing. 
He says of it: 
It seems too buttoned-up and white-
chokered and clean-shaven a thing to speak 
for the vast slow-breathing unconscious 
Kosmos with its dread abysses and its un-
known tides. 2 
Royce interprets Hegel's Absolute ns a living thing, 
rather than static and blocked: 
No, Hegel's Absolute is, I repeat, 
a man of war. The dust and the blood 
of ages of humanity's spiritual life are 
upon him; he comes before us pierced and 
wounded, but triumphant ,---the God who 
has conquered contradictions, and who is 
simply the total spiritual consciousness 
that expresses, embraces, unifies, and 
1 To~~send, PIUS, 185. 
2 James, ERE, 277. 
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enjoys the whole wealth of our human 
loyalty, endurance, and passion.l 
Both Hegel and Royce emphasize the social character 
of reason, and both look to a unitary Absolute. Negativity 
is a major factor in the systems of both Royce and Hegel. 
Royce seems to take a position between the Hegelians of the 
Left, with their quantitative pluralism, and the Hegelians 
of the Right, with their quantitative singularism; for in 
his emphasis upon the oneness of the Absolute, Royce is eo-
sential~y a singularist, yet in his later philosophy he 
attempts to give a definite place to the individual will and 
seems almost to become a pluralist, the result of which is a 
sort of pluralistic singularism. 
Although some few criticisms have been made concern-
ing Royce's treatments, his interpretations, as a whole, are 
clear, sympathetic, and profound, and are presented in schol-
arly yet pleasing style. Royce's own philosophy, like Hegel's, 
joined the traditional theories together in a coherent unity, 
yet Royce was not at all biased by historical concepts. With 
a thorough knowledge of the history of philosophy, Royce coupled 
his own originality and ingenuity to create his philosophical 
system. 
He carried his past with him, not drop-
ping early conceptions, but evolving them 
continually into richer eignificance.2 
1 Royce, SMP, 216. 
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SUMMARY 
Royce has interpreted four leading thinkers who 
illustrate, respectively, four important steps in the his-
tory of modern philosophyJ Spinoza, the naturalist and ab-
solutist; Berkeley, the romantic idealist; Kant, the ration-
al intuitionist and seer of the inner life; and Hegel, who 
combined the doctrines of all three philosophers in a unitary 
relation to one another. 
Two aspects of Spinoza are treated, his religion and 
his political theories. As a thorough-going mystic, Spinoza 
abandons the finite world and its transient nature, and looks 
to a great and perfect Eternal for comfort in his disillusion-
ment. Basing his mystical belief on the axiom that whatever 
cannot be explained by its own nature is to be exp1ained by 
some higher nature that forces it to be what it is, Spinoza 
proceeds to name the higher nature Substance. Spinoza's 
substance is infinite and self-evident, aelf-determined and 
eternal, and is the cause of all the happenings in the world. 
The two attributes of Substance are bod~ly substance and 
t~ e thinking substance. 
t'' In treating Spinoza's political and ethical theories, 
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Royce, for the purpose of clarification, compares the theories 
0 of Hobbes and Spinoza. Both thinkers base their views on the 
assumption that man is by nature selfish, and that the state 
of nature is one of constant conflict. Hobbes solves the 
political problem by declaring that for his own comfort, man 
should sacrifice a certain amount of his individual freedom 
for the sake of eliminating warfare, and should submit to a 
political system of social absolutism. Spinoza founds his 
state on laws of justice and freedom and does not hold, as 
does Hobbes, to social absolutism. Royce discusses the ~-
tatus Theolog!co-Politicus in which Spinoza considers the 
place of religion in the state and concludes that religious 
sects should not intrude their trite quarrels into the affairs 
of government. 
Royce treats the poetic Berkeley as being typical of 
the reaction of the eighteenth century against naturalism. 
With his rather elementary idealism, Berkeley takes his place 
in the rediscovery of the inner life. Observing that the 
world of experience and the world of sense had within them 
no discoverable substance at all, and that things would not 
exist unless they were being thought about, Berkeley solves 
his problem by believing in the existence of a great eternal 
mind, his God. This God is constantly thinking on all things, 
=~~~~ ~-.r================================== 
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nnd to His all-seeing mind, the succession of our ideae owes 
its existence. Royce holds that Berkeley's theology is real-
istic, und objects to his theory that matter exists only in 
the form of ideas forced upon our minds by God. This theory 
seems precarious to Royce. Berkel~yJ s Nature is too abstract 
and illusory a conception to Royce who, in his own philosophy, 
holds that Nature exists as identical with the Absolute in a 
universal sense. 
Royce considers Kant's contribution to philosophy as 
extremely important. Mercilessly analytical and self-critical, 
Kant broke down worlds of thought and abandoned some of his 
own earlier theories. Admitting that he found difficulty in 
his study of Kant, Royce attempts to restate those portions 
of Kant's thought which seem of primary importance. To Kant, 
man is the source of the laws of nature. Royce compares Kant's 
Religion of Duty with the mystical passion of Spinoza. Kant's 
God is a God without sentiment, whose revelation is to the 
conscience, which, in turn, reveals to man the moral law. 
Faith, to Kant, is an active postulate. 
To Kant, space and time are self-contradictory and 
only conditions of our sense-understanding of things---this 
is the doctrine which Kant called the ideality of time and 
space, and it was this theory which led to hio later assumption 
---57---
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that there exists a world of things in themselves which are 
unknowable. In answer to Hume•s statement that the facts 
of the world are unconnected, Kant presented his theory of 
rational consciousness, or the transcendental unity of apper-
ception, which involves self-recognition and binds fact to 
experience. The poet-Kantians saw time and space ina much 
closer relation to the categories than did Kant, and even 
thought of them as definable in terms of the categories. 
Investigating the nature of human knowledge, Kant 
objects to the general opinion that we know only what our 
experience teache:..; us. This theory does not define experience 
nor does it take into account the results of the combination 
of reason and experience. Metaphysical knowledge of anything 
beyond the self is impossible, according to Kant. Empirical 
facts are of two kinds, he believes: present perceptions and 
conceptual constructions. To for~ the second kind we employ 
time, space, and the categories, and link our conceptions of 
invisible phenomena with our present experience. This makes 
for unity of consciousness, or human intelligence. The deduc-
tion of the categories made known four thoughts, according to 
Royce: that we know t hinge only as they appear to us, that 
! 
1• 
we can know through reflection the conditions upon which 
0 knowledge depends, that a priori forms merely fill in the 
I 
II 
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outline of experience, and that all of our experience is a 
unity, related to the categories, time and apace, and all 
possible experience. 
Regretting the fact that Hegel as a man was not of 
a particularly commendable character, Royce examines Hegel's 
analysis of matter and his theory of the nature of self-con-
sciousness. Hegel sees that there is paradox in consciousness, 
it is differentiated. Life truly exists only when we contern-
plate on it from a distance and recognize the existence of 
another self of the past moment. To make for the unification 
of consciousness, Hegel makes his Absolute a man of war, a 
spirit which bears the contradictions of life. The Hegelian 
doctrine of concrete universals is the attempt to come to the 
unification of all things finite into one great universal. 
In this manner Hegel stri vee to overcome dualisn1 and unify 
life in the Absolute. 
It is obvious, that in his treatment of these four 
philosophers, Royce does not attempt to oe thorough, but 
selects the essential theories from the system of each thinker. 
Despite his sympathy for Spinoza's mysticism, Royce 
discards this mystical theory of being in his discussion of 
historical concepts. The mystical view seems to Royce to be 
too abstract and too subjective to be valid. Royce neglects 
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to consider the fact that Spinoza, though supposed to be a 
rationalist, depends upon his experience in order to name the 
attributes of Substance. Both Royce and Spinoza look to a 
great Absolute to explain that which cannot explain itself 
by its own nature. Royce fails to comment on the weakness 
of Spinoza's reason for the stability of his government. 
Royce marvels at Spinoza's healthy religious and social out-
look despite his isolation. This healthy attitude might be 
partly explained by psychology, for in spite of his loneli-
ness, Spinoza was financially independent and enjoyed to a 
certain extent the simple life of those with whom he lived. 
Royce does not treat Berkeley with a great degree 
of seriousness, and dubs his idealism as preparatory. Royce 
fails to see that, though Berkeley's thought has been enlarged 
to quite an extent, Berkeley was, after all, the first to 
emphasize certain principles. It is interesting to note, 
and Royce makes little of this point, that though Berkeley's 
primary aim in philosophy was to break down the skepticism 
and agnosticism of the materialists, he was the second figure 
in a three-fold movement which ended in complete skepticism. 
Much may be said in addition to Royce's treatment, 
of the effect of Kant's philosophy upon history. Kant's 
thought has often been called a Copernican Revolution because 
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it precipitated such wide controversy. In his discussion of 
Kant's limited belief in knowledge and his postulating of God, 
there is a logical fallacy which Royce does not mention. There 
is analogy between Royce's and Kant's moral arguoent for the 
existence of God. Royce neglects, too, Kant's view of rational 
freedom, which seems to be unethical in its implications. Kant's 
theory of moral obligation is similar to Royce's belief in the 
double nature of man. 
For some peculiar reason Royce will not acknowledge 
the influence of Hegel upon his own philosophy. In treating 
Hegel's character, Royce is obviously influenced by Schopen-
hauer. Both Hegel and Royce believe in the value of the his-
torical approach to problems of philosophy, that metaphysics 
is the center of philosophy, that the dialectical method is 
most desirable, that logic and metaphysics are inseparable. 
Both thinkers hold that the identification of the individual 
will vnth the universal will is the content of the moral 
ideal, both emphasize the social character of reason and 
both look to a unitary Absolute. Negativity is of major im-
portance in the theories of both Royce and Hegel. Royce's 
interpretation of Hegel's Absolute is much more understanding 
than is that of James. While James sees the Absolute as a 
static thing, Royce interprets it as a living man of war. 
\ ~~====~======================================~================= ~ 
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Royce takes a position between the Hegelians of the Left and 
0 the Hegelians of the Right as his pluralistic singularism 
would indicate. 
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